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ver the recent weeks, we have gotten an
eye-opening, though relatively brief, pre-
view of how profound changes in the
structure of world financial markets have magni-
fied the potential for extreme market volatility that
can reverberate across the global financial system.
Today, I want to speak to you about those struc-
tural changes, the new financial risks they will
almost certainly spawn, and how these serious
financial risks should be contained. For it is unde-
niable that we have moved into a more hazardous
environment in which new financial excesses are
practically unavoidable. The reason is that certain
defects are already deeply imbedded in the genes
of our financial condition. These defects will con-
tribute to progressively greater fluctuations in the
prices of stocks, bonds, and currencies, to bouts of
turbulence in the credit markets, and possibly to a
plunge in financial asset values that will dwarf
what we have experienced so far this year.
Indeed, from a longer perspective, the latest
swings in bond and stock prices are likely to be
merely a prologue to much greater volatility in the
years ahead. This potential for financial trauma is
a by-product of radical changes in the structure of
financial institutions and markets that over time
are leaving the system without an adequate institu-
tional buffer and, therefore, more susceptible to sharp
oscillations in the flows of investment and credit.
While new financial excesses cannot be totally
prevented, proper action can mitigate their ad-
verse consequences to some extent. To accomplish
that, however, we must be willing to acknowledge
the risks that lie ahead, to take them into account
in the formulation of monetary policy, and to make
some fundamental changes in the structure of of-
ficial oversight and regulation of financial institu-
tions and markets.
I suspect that to many it seems incongruous
that market volatility has burst forth in a dramatic
way at the very time when the financial positions
of American households, corporations, and finan-
cial institutions themselves were on the mend.
Financial rehabilitation in the United States has,
in fact, proceeded at a very good pace. Debt bur-
dens have been reduced sharply and capital posi-
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But there is a dark side to financial rehabilita-
tion. A sense of financial well-being—and the
capacity of aspiring demanders of credit to tap into
the resources of willing lenders and investors—is
a necessary condition for incubating new financial
excesses.  Thus, it would be wrong to become
complacent about what might follow as the eco-
nomic expansion matures. Sooner or later, credit
demands of businesses and households will begin
to pick up momentum, and stronger financial
institutions will be in a position to readily meet
those demands. Monetary policy will switch, first,
from accommodating to neutral as it has already
started to do in the last few months and, eventually,
toward overt restraint. Somewhere in this sequence
of events, the structural changes in the financial
markets will have a far more profound impact on





I particularly want to call attention to three
structural changes that keep the financial system
vulnerable to excess.
First, in the United States, traditional lending
and investing institutions are playing a diminish-
ing role in determining the composition of invest-
ment and the response to market developments,
whereas the household sector, mainly through the
vehicle of the mutual fund, is playing an enor-
mously expanded and still unfolding role.
Second, the global financial markets are under-
going what I would call the “Americanization of
finance.” This encompasses (1) increasing de-
regulation of markets and institutions, (2) rapidly
increasing securitization, (3) much greater use of
new financial instruments and trading techniques,
especially incorporating financial derivatives, and
(4)  the growing presence in the markets of an
expanding group of “high-octane” portfolio man-
agers who are free to roam throughout the finan-
cial sphere, in and out of currencies, equities,
bonds, commodities, and related derivative instru-
ments with primarily a very near-term focus and
no particular loyalty to any national marketplace.
Third, both in the United States and in most
of the major industrial countries, a tremendous
infrastructure has been put in place to promote
credit creation. Most of the newcomers operate
outside the conventional banking system and
therefore largely outside the purview of central
banks. But conventional depository institutions,
now with rebuilt capital positions, are also in a
position to lend. Thus, the potential for rapid in-
creases in credit is high. Add these three structural
changes together and we have a lush environment
for cultivating financial excesses.
Let me try to put some dimensions on each of
these three elements.
MUTUAL FUNDS AND DIMINISHED
ROLE OF TRADITIONAL
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
For nearly three decades—that is, from the
early 1960s until the beginning of the 1990s—the
archetypal institutional investor was the pension
fund of a major multinational corporation or of a
state and local government entity. Supplanting
insurance companies, which had been the preemi-
nent institutional investor in prior decades, these
funds grew over this period by almost $2 trillion,
or about two-thirds of the total increase in institu-
tional net financial assets. But by the onset of this
decade, that electrifying growth had already be-
gun to taper off, mainly as a by-product of corpo-
rate restructuring. As the corporate giants, one by
one, moved to shed business lines and employees,
and as defined contribution plans began to super-
sede the defined benefit plans of yesteryear, pen-
sion fund growth started to flatten.
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funds boomed. One of the most interesting aspects
of the mutual fund phenomenon is how long the
vehicle existed before truly significant amounts of
money were invested in them. As recently as the
end of 1984, the combined total of equity and bond
mutual funds in the United States amounted to
only a little over $100 billion, less than 2 percent
of total financial net worth of households. Since
then, mutual funds have mushroomed and now
substitute for conventional bank deposits. Of that
total, $1 trillion is owned directly by households,
representing almost 10 percent of household financial
net worth.
Perhaps even more significant are the follow-
ing facts: Since the stock market crash of October
1987, equity mutual funds have swelled from
about $180 billion to some $700 billion through a
combination of fresh inflows of funds and capital
gains. What this means is that the average investor
in equity mutual funds has never experienced a
prolonged bear market. Neither has the average
investor in fixed-income mutual funds. From the
onset of the secular bull market in bonds which
began in 1982, the assets of bond mutual funds
increased by a factor of 35 times, from a minuscule
$20 billion to over $700 billion. Up until last fall,
only a minority of individuals had much personal
memory as investors of what happens to bond
prices—and consequently mutual fund net asset
values—when interest rates start a protracted
cyclical rise.
The fact is that we do not know how the
ordinary investor in mutual funds will react when
equity prices and bond prices continue to display
spasms of volatility, instead of the highly agree-
able upside volatility to which most had grown
accustomed. Probably the sternest test will come
as the economic expansion matures, credit de-
mands start to lift, and short-term interest rates
move persistently higher. At some point, after
repeated bouts of volatility in the stock and bond
markets, interest rates on CDs or other money
market instruments, which will have moved
higher, will no longer be looked at contemptu-
ously by many investors, new inflows into mutual
funds will dry up, and many individuals may
become net sellers. The managers of mutual funds
have no really viable alternative but to pass
through these sales into the market. They cannot
take a view apart from their investors; they cannot
leverage mutual fund portfolios to take advantage
of what they might think will be a temporary
downward price correction. They will have to sell
regardless of the impact on prices and regardless
of whether other buyers of equities and bonds step
forward quickly to buy.
I understand that there are valid differences of
opinion on how the individual investor will be-
have under such circumstances. Some recall the
transitory nature of the October 1987 stock market
break and say that individuals generally will be
slow to act, essentially riding out sharp contrac-
tions in equity and bond prices and thereby pro-
viding a buffer against more proactive traders.
Perhaps. But that assumption of sluggishness on
the part of the ordinary citizen proved to be con-
spicuously wrong in the case of the mortgage
market. Homeowners were not at all sluggish in
taking advantage of lower interest rates to refi-
nance existing mortgages. On the contrary, they
acted with an alacrity that utterly confounded the
vast statistical models run by market profession-
als. As prepayments surged, holders of mortgage
securities who were operating under the flawed
assumption of household inertia were badly burnt.
Drawing an analogy from that episode, I con-
clude that it is a potentially grievous error to
assume that individual investors will always be
slow to react to sudden, highly visible setbacks in
stock prices, bond prices, or both—certainly not
in a world when all an investor has to do in order
to switch from an equity or bond fund into a money
market fund is to go to the telephone and push a
sequence of buttons. The technology is in place for
a cascade of selling by investors in mutual funds.
Consequently, I am even more seriously con-
cerned now than a year or two ago when I began
calling attention to this lurking problem—namely,
that excesses originating in the mutual funds area
may be the source of an economic shock should
an asset price bubble be suddenly burst. An abrupt,
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have a powerful impact on consumption deci-
sions, leading to a postponement or even abandon-
ment of spending on homes, cars, and other
big-ticket  items. Such a wealth effect may swamp
other, more conventional determinants of house-
hold expenditure. In extreme cases, it could be
large enough to precipitate an economic contrac-
tion. In principle, the central bank could offset this
contractionary impact by easing monetary policy,
but in practice that might be a hard thing for the
Federal Reserve to do, since the shift out of equity
and bond mutual funds and into money funds and
bank deposits will naturally swell the monetary
aggregates. Because this whole chain of events is
most likely to occur at a time when the central
bank is already engaged in a process of tightening
money and credit conditions, it is not impossible
to suppose that there will be at least some delay in
making the decision to engineer such an abrupt
about-face in policy.
It seems to me that not enough thought has
gone into the question of how mutual funds should
be regulated and supervised. This is not meant to
be critical of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC), which is the official institution
charged with overseeing the U.S. mutual fund
industry. But the time has come when we have to
be concerned not only with the issues of fraud and
abuse, which is the conventional focus of the SEC,
and consider the systemic implications of the ex-
plosion of mutual funds. We need to evaluate two
things: First, the consequences for the American
economy and for the financial markets of a poten-
tial sudden sell-off of mutual fund shares and,
secondly, how to limit the impact of such shocks
by putting in place a waiting period for fund sales
in order to drive home to investors that equity and
bond funds are not to be considered close substi-
tutes for money funds and bank CDs. In a sense,
this would be the functional equivalent of the
circuit breakers installed by the stock exchanges
and the futures exchanges, which were designed
to introduce some delay when the market is
stunned by a surge in volatility. The question of
how to shield the system from a collapse of con-
fidence in mutual funds is one more reason why
comprehensive reform of financial regulation is
badly needed, going well beyond the narrow
industry focus of proposals now on the table.
AMERICANIZATION OF GLOBAL
FINANCE
The second area of profound structural change
in finance is what I have earlier referred to as the
“Americanization” of global finance. This involves
progressive deregulation of financial markets. It
means a greater access of borrowers to different
types of credit products, therefore greatly expand-
ing credit availability to both businesses and
households. In addition, Americanization entails a
significant extension of securitization to many
other capital markets in the world. In the all-
important markets for government securities it en-
tails a gradual adoption of many of the practices
that first developed in the American government
securities market, such as repurchase agreements,
scheduled auctions, and increased participation of
foreign investors. Greater securitization means
that over a period of time, more and more financial
assets will be marked to market, and fewer assets
will be sheltered from potentially volatile price
changes, as is the case when loans are held on the
balance sheets of traditional lenders. Americani-
zation also involves the broadening of profes-
sional portfolio management, usually with a very
short-term investment horizon and the widespread
use of performance measurements which more
deeply ingrain this behavior.
In practical terms, the implications of Ameri-
canization are far-reaching: To begin with, virtu-
ally all major industrial countries are now living
within the confines of a more or less deregulated
financial system, wherein financial entrepreneurs
are the principal players reshaping this system.
Granted, a handful of depository institutions, par-
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even in Western Europe, are operating under
greater official scrutiny because the memories of
recent excesses are still vivid. But a whole host of
other banks, together with unregulated or lightly
regulated financial institutions, are engaged in
pushing their own risk-taking in new directions,
and sometimes to unaccustomed limits. The com-
mon denominator is to try to jump into any market
niche where returns appear to be greater than
average, regardless of the long-term compatibility
of that line of business to the underlying experi-
ence and strengths of the firm. As a result, we can
expect to see some significant missteps by at least
a few of the more hard-driving competitors.
Moreover, high-octane portfolio managers are
expanding in number and in the magnitude of
funds they deploy. The ultimate evolution of the
risk-taking financial entrepreneur is the portfolio
manager who can go long or short in any market,
in any currency, and on a leveraged or an unlever-
aged basis—and who often can do this in a tax-
advantaged off-shore vehicle, with minimal, if
any, official supervision. When full leverage is
employed by this new breed of managers, I suspect
that they can command portfolios totaling upwards
of $500 billion, although no official statistics are
kept by any national or international agency—
which itself is a matter for concern.
Why is this class of investor a potential incu-
bator of the next round of financial excess? After
all, if they make a misjudgment on the market,
their contributing investors will merely lose
money, and since those investors are by definition
highly sophisticated, as well as wealthy, they can
afford the hit. The reason has to do with human
behavior. When the managers of large high-octane
portfolios go into the market to build sizable risk
positions, others inevitably follow, since it is prac-
tically impossible to disguise these substantial
positions completely. The hangers-on have bene-
fited handsomely when the leaders have been
right. But experience teaches that no one is clair-
voyant, however astute technically or financially.
The leaders also get it wrong from time to time,
and while their investors might tolerate the result-
ing losses, others may not be so fortunate.
Finally, the growing use of financial deriva-
tives is itself another manifestation of Americani-
zation. What are some of the concerns that this
development poses? I would cite the following: 
(1) The current high profitability in financial
derivatives will inevitably pull in a greater number
of market participants. This will eventually gener-
ate excess capacity, depressing profit margins and
inducing many to move to the marginal edge of
risk-taking where competition is least and fees are
most lucrative.
(2) Another set of concerns in financial deriva-
tives involves the matter of exposure to credit
risks. No one knows whether adequate credit
evaluations are possible, especially when they
relate to exposures resulting from transactions
with new types of organizations, such as leveraged
funds for which conventional credit ratings are
inapplicable, or with subsidiaries of non-financial
corporations which may have a complex and not
entirely unambiguous relationship with the parent.
This type of problem was apparent in the recent
difficulties encountered by Germany’s Metallge-
sellschaft. I, along with others, have concerns
about an erosion of credit standards as competition
in the marketplace increases.
(3)  As for the potential for market disruption,
I question whether market risks in financial deriva-
tives can always be managed and whether any
open position can always be covered before it goes
hopelessly wrong. Experience has shown that
whenever there is even the slightest chance of
trading halts or of the abandonment of market-
making by leading dealers, normal market access
shrinks. As a result, new hedges cannot be put on
when essentially everybody in the market is trying
to do the same thing at the same time. Thus,
volatility can balloon by orders of magnitudes,
defeating even the best planned hedging strategy.
(4) A related problem for hedging risks is the
danger of basing hedging strategies on statistical
models relying on past behavioral patterns. The
structural changes alone in financial markets are
bound to cause significant deviations from past
relationships. There is no way in which these
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(5) A final source of concern about these mar-
kets is simply this: Financial derivatives permit
greater leverage in the system, allowing marginal
borrowers to stay in the market longer than would
otherwise be possible.
While I raise this concern in the context of
financial derivatives, my worry is actually a
broader one. As I mentioned in my introductory
remarks, financial rehabilitation, while essential
for creating the conditions for a strong revival of
business activity, has a dark side. It is that the
infrastructure for vigorous credit expansion has
not only been rebuilt but has been enlarged in the




I suppose that the late Sidney Homer and I,
back in the 1960s, were the first to coin the term
“credit crunch” to describe an abrupt discontinuity
in the flow of credit that may set severe contrac-
tionary economic forces in motion. In fact, both
before and since, the history of business and finan-
cial cycles has been punctuated by sharp disconti-
nuities in the channels of credit creation. Those
disruptions  have had varying causes—ranging
from quantitative rationing in decades past engen-
dered by such devices as Regulation Q ceilings, to
the credit quality rationing that characterized the
financial crunch of the latest cyclical episode. But
regardless of origin, these discontinuities had
similar effects: they set in motion a sequence of
events that eventually was responsible for termi-
nating a period of economic expansion by choking
off credit availability to important segments of the
economy.
Today, when memories of the most recent
financial crunch are still fresh in our minds, it may
come as a surprise to hear me warn of the unprece-
dented infrastructure for credit creation that is
now in place in the United States and soon will be
in other major financial centers. Commercial
banks and many thrift institutions have shifted
from a position of capital insufficiency to capital
surfeit. They show a renewed appetite for lending
and are in a position either to issue CDs or to
liquefy securities holdings to finance new lending.
But the nonbank financial institutions and open
credit markets, which have successfully wrested
considerable market share in lending to businesses
and households away from the depository institu-
tions are not about to disappear. Instead, they are
in a position to move even more aggressively to
make use of their considerable capacity to lend.
Moreover, the infrastructure in place to sup-
port extensive securitization is available for
branching out into new markets. Securitization of
mortgages, credit card receivables, and auto loans
is just the beginning of the process, not the end of
it. Domestically, home equity loans will be secu-
ritized to an increasing degree. What will probably
follow will be widespread securitization of ordi-
nary commercial loans, with or without the estab-
lishment of government sponsored entities to
lubricate the process.
Internationally, securitization is advancing
quickly, with discordant results. For example, we
have experienced the rather extensive securitiza-
tion of Less Developed Country (LDC) debt,
which has effectively transferred the great bulk of
the previously outstanding bank loans by repack-
aging them either as conventional bonds or as debt
obligations that trade like bonds. This has been the
product not only of the elaborate debt restructur-
ing exercises supported by the United States and
other industrial country governments, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), and the banks, but it
also reflects the substantial new issuance of secu-
rities on behalf of LDC borrowers. An estimated
$75 billion of such new securitized assets have
been absorbed by the public markets in the past
five years, with a growing portion of the invest-
ment flows coming from the mutual funds and
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done a great deal to solve one problem, namely
extricating the major commercial banks from their
past credit misjudgments, only to introduce new
and potentially formidable risks. In recent weeks,
the market for the debt of emerging countries has
undergone truly extraordinary turbulence, with
price fluctuations averaging three to four times
those of U.S. Treasuries. Consider how much
greater volatility may become if one or more of
the large emerging countries run into economic
difficulties and cannot service the bonds.
Reschedulings will turn out to be even harder to
negotiate in a world of securitized obligations than
they were during the bleakest days of the LDC
debt crisis of the 1980s, since bondholders, with
no ancillary business to protect, are unlikely to be
as cooperative as bankers—and in retrospect the
cooperation of those bankers was not entirely
enthusiastic, either.
From a broad economic policy perspective,
securitization will have far-reaching conse-
quences. In such an evolving world, the degree of
credit restraint in operation at any particular time
will not be measurable by standard money supply
or even bank credit indicators. Other time-honored
rules of thumb, such as the notion that financial
intermediaries are in the business of borrowing
short and lending long, will be turned on their
heads. Finance companies engaged in active secu-
ritization may be borrowing long and lending
short, while hedging their exposure to interest rate
movements through a series of transactions in
financial futures and options. Surges in credit de-
mand therefore may not have the conventional
effect of flattening the yield curve; the impulses
may be quickly transmitted up and down the yield
curve through the actions of the new lending origi-
nators. This will indirectly impart greater volatil-
ity on intermediate and longer term bond markets,
with corresponding effects on equity markets.
As a consequence, in the emerging financial
world of high-octane, high credit availability fi-
nance, restraint will come more from unprece-
dented asset price variation and less from squeezes
on short-term credit availability or cost. This
world will have striking implications for monetary
policy, for the financial supervisors and regula-
tors, and for various market participants, including
commercial banks. Let me discuss each in turn
beginning with implications for monetary policy.
IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY
POLICY
Central bankers throughout the industrial
world are struggling with a dilemma. On the one
hand, they have achieved an extraordinary inde-
pendence in the formulation and execution of
monetary policy. The Bundesbank, the Federal
Reserve, and the Bank of Canada already had a
substantial measure of independence. But now the
central banks of France, Italy, and even Japan are
operating with considerably more independence
than ever before. Only the Bank of England is
formally subordinate to the UK Government, but
I suspect it is only a matter of time before that will
change and a form of independence compatible
with British constitutional traditions will be crafted.
On the other hand, there is no longer any
reliable analytical guidepost on which to direct
monetary policy. The vast structural changes in the
financial system that I have described make it
impossible for any central bank to anchor policy
to any monetary or credit target. There is no alter-
native but to fall back on judgment. But judgment
exercised toward what objective? Significant dif-
ferences of view now exist on what the basic objec-
tives of monetary policy should be, especially
among politicians, academics, and financial mar-
ket participants, although perhaps less so among
central bankers themselves.
Let me state my own view up front. I believe
that the primary objective of a central bank should
be to maintain the financial well-being of society
in the broadest sense. That means establishing
stable financial conditions by exercising careful
oversight over financial markets, institutions, and
trading practices, anticipating potential problems,
and taking remedial action before they can do
widespread damage. Thus, it means pursuing
ECONOMIC  REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1994 11monetary policy actions what will over a period of
time provide the foundation for the successful
achievement of sustainable economic growth with
minimal inflation, and with minimal risks of fi-
nancial shocks that could disrupt the economy.
Therefore, I do not go along with the line of
thinking that maintains that the central bank
should have only the most single-minded of ob-
jectives: specifically the pursuit of price stability,
perhaps defined as a target range for the inflation
rate. In my view, the logic for enshrining such a
narrow objective—namely, that an environment
of low inflation is both a necessary and sufficient
condition for economic growth and financial mar-
ket stability—is flawed, and in practice such a
price-stability objective will rarely, if ever, be
faithfully pursued.
Indeed, I would argue that because it fails to
give precedence to maintaining the financial well-
being of society, it is a deceptive objective, for the
following reasons:
First, low inflation, while obviously desirable
in and of itself because it does contribute to a
sturdy framework for a nation’s economic pros-
perity, is nonetheless no guarantee against the
emergence of financial excesses. History proves
this conclusively. The classic case for the United
States was the decade of the 1920s, when inflation
remained low, but financial excesses developed
both in the equity market and in commercial real
estate. In recent times, we also have the vivid
example of the mid-1980s. Inflation performance
was exemplary; the rise in the consumer price
index in 1986 was one of the lowest in the entire
postwar period. But within the fabric of our finan-
cial markets there was developing some of the
worst financial excesses of this century, a process
that would eventually lead to massive financial
failures, huge taxpayer costs, and a largely unfore-
seen credit crunch that would aggravate the busi-
ness downturn and constrain the subsequent
economic recovery. Arguably, low inflation is a
necessary condition for financial well-being, but
it surely is not a sufficient condition for financial
well-being. That requires a more complex set of
economic and financial circumstances grounded
not only by a central bank’s monetary actions but
also by its role as the institution entrusted with
assuring the safety and soundness of the financial
system as a whole.
Second, an obsession with achieving low in-
flation at all costs carries other risks. Long-lasting
economic stagnation can bring about a potentially
large  and highly undesirable  redistribution of
wealth. Thus, the approach can over a period of
time undermine public support for free markets.
This may eventually be manifested in a swing
toward a narrowly nationalistic posture on inter-
national trade and thus can do considerable dam-
age to important principles.
Third, the alternative to a sole central banking
objective of low inflation is not indifference to the
rate of inflation. Central banks that have acqui-
esced in, or abetted, high inflation are practicing
a form of financial corruption that eventually de-
stroys national unity and ends up in financial ruin.
But for a central bank that has built up a reputation
of integrity and devotion to stability, there is a
powerful case for looking beyond the inflation
situation at any particular time and anticipating
how the inflation rate will evolve in reaction to
changing economic circumstances. This means
that such a central bank will be able to pursue an
accommodative monetary policy even in the face
of a lingering rate of inflation which is higher than
the expected rate that will eventuate over a long
time period. This ability to craft a policy on the
basis of sound analysis of future trends, rather than
moving in lockstep with available data that nec-
essarily record only what has already happened, is
the hallmark of sensible effective monetary control.
As I see it, the proper responsibility of the
central bank—assuring the financial well-being of
society—requires an intimate involvement in fi-
nancial supervision and regulation. In fact, I have
long believed that it is only the central bank,
among the various regulatory agencies which
share responsibility in this area, that can represent
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This should be the central organizing principle
behind any comprehensive reform of financial




The danger of a new round of financial ex-
cesses presents a clear challenge to the official
supervisory and regulatory structure for financial
institutions. I have argued over the years for a
serious effort to reform in a fundamental way the
convoluted system of financial regulation we have
stumbled into. I have also supported efforts to
forge a better international harmonization of super-
visory, regulatory, accounting, and trading stand-
ards and practices. In both realms, the domestic
and the international, much work is left to be done.
Recently, the U.S. Treasury put forward a
proposal for reform of one relatively circum-
scribed, though no doubt important, part of the
regulatory structure—consolidating bank exami-
nations in one agency so as to eliminate a good
deal of duplication of effort and expense in the
current system. On its face, it is a legitimate goal,
but the benefits of reducing duplication need to be
weighed against the costs of restricting the Federal
Reserve’s direct role in financial supervision and
regulation. On this issue, once the public relations
phase of the bureaucratic tug-of-war has run its
course, I would expect a reasonable compromise
can be worked out.
The main reason why I am not an enthusiastic
supporter of the Treasury proposal is that it is too
narrow. It misses most of the key structural
changes in domestic and global financial institu-
tions and markets that I described earlier in my
talk. What is really needed is a comprehensive
overhaul of regulation and supervision. That
would involve a number of elements.
One, we need to bring together banking, secu-
rities, and insurance regulators to reach agreement
on  standards—accounting standards, disclosure
standards, and trading standards, and on minimum
capital requirements. This should also include
nonbank institutions such as finance companies,
which are now effectively unregulated. At the
present time, there are large differences from
country to country and within countries from one
type of financial institution to another. They are
out of touch with the realities of how markets now
work and how business is being done. Harmoni-
zation is essential to ensure fairness in the market-
place and to avoid the lowest common
denominator outcome as institutions practice what
is known as “regulatory arbitrage.” I might add
that the Internal Revenue Service and its counter-
parts in other countries also ought to be included
in this process, so that tax considerations do not
unduly influence the location and form of finan-
cial activity.
Two, in order to reduce the danger of sharp
setbacks in bond and stock prices that would en-
danger economic growth, I propose that investors
in bond and stock mutual funds be required to give
60 to 90 days’ withdrawal notice. This condition
would be roughly analogous to the long-standing
requirement that applies to Certificates of Deposit
and time deposits at banks and thrifts. It would
reinforce the notion that mutual funds are not cash
equivalents and should be approached as a serious
investment. It would have the desirable effect of
forcing investors to become more aware than they
appear to be at the moment of the risks they are
exposing themselves to through investment in
such funds and will introduce a useful brake on
exaggerated reactions to abrupt price movements.
Since it is a significant departure from existing
procedures, this measure should be phased in
gradually beginning with net new investments.
Three, these and the many other issues that
inevitably flow from the greater internationali-
zation and complexity of finance cannot be dealt
with reasonably and in a timely way without an
ongoing institutional capability. I have long be-
lieved that the most promising approach would be
to establish a new international institution to serve
as the focal point for regulatory harmonization.
A “Board of Overseers of Major International
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consisting of central bank and other governmental
agencies. It should also include members drawn
from the private sector. It should be empowered to
set mutually acceptable minimum capital require-
ments for all major institutions, to establish uni-
form trading, reporting, and disclosure standards
for open credit markets, and to monitor the per-
formance of institutions and markets under its
jurisdiction.
OUTLOOK FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS
AND INSTITUTIONS
Let me conclude by highlighting seven key
implications that arise from the intersection of the
structural changes in financial markets and insti-
tutions and the cyclical condition of the U.S. and
foreign economies. 
First, volatility in financial markets is bound
to increase significantly further in the period
ahead. The increased importance of risk “pass
through” institutions, notably mutual funds,
which merely transmit the investment decisions of
their investors and take no risks of their own, and
the diminished role of traditional financial institu-
tions that take risks onto their own balance sheets
magnifies the danger of wide swings in equity and
bond prices. This volatility will also be enhanced
by the continued rapid growth of securitized assets
and the more subdued increase in nonmarketable
assets, as the practice of marking to market be-
comes the norm rather than the exception. More-
over, as we move from a period of secular rise in
equity and bond prices to a more unsteady future,
the likelihood of episodes of sudden asset price
declines will increase. Financial markets are better
equipped to shift risk from one participant to an-
other, especially through the use of financial de-
rivatives. But that reallocation of risk does not
materially lessen the danger of a period of disor-
derly trading in the vent of an unforeseen shock.
Those financial institutions that have been unduly
complacent about their capacity to insulate them-
selves by supposing that they can always go into
the market to hedge risks are the most vulnerable
to an adverse surprise.
Second, in the new financial environment, the
Federal Reserve may find it impossible to flatten
the short-to-long yield curve, let alone invert it.
The reason is that conventional rules of thumb
about the impact of monetary policy actions on the
financial markets no longer apply in a financial
world dominated by mutual funds and other risk
“pass through” institutions. Also of importance for
monetary policy, the decline in segmented finan-
cial markets, wherein financial institutions used to
be able to count on making moderate profits with-
out straining to deal with fierce competition, com-
bined with the move toward a mark to market
requirement, will make it far more difficult for
affected institutions to take the longer view that
might otherwise justify holding onto long posi-
tions in stocks or bonds through a financial storm.
Consequently, at the next cyclical peak in interest
rates, short-term rates—such as on three-month
Treasury bills—may reach close to 7 percent while
the yield on long U.S. Governments may trade
somewhere in the 9 percent to 10 percent range.
Third, for well-managed commercial banks
involved in traditional lending and investing with
floating rates of return on assets and variable rate
liabilities, the persistence of a positively sloped
yield curve will continue to be highly beneficial.
They will also benefit from a further consolidation
in banking, improving their capacity to maintain
a profitable pricing structure.
Fourth, the greatest threat to the stability of
the system will probably come through more aggres-
sive and more lightly regulated participants in the
marketplace or through banks that seek to exploit
the new vogues.
Fifth, central banks will be compelled to move
away from a strategy of gradualism and give
greater weight to actual and prospective condi-
tions in financial markets in conducting monetary
policy. Gradualism gives the appearance of pru-
14 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYdence and caution, but actually imparts consider-
able risks onto the economy and the financial
markets. In a period of deteriorating economic
conditions, when excess productive capacity
emerges and the private sector faces financial
difficulties, gradualism prolongs distress and in-
hibits economic and financial rehabilitation. The
central bank must be willing to act before the
inflation rate has had a chance to respond to the
emergence of slack and the weakening of demand
pressures in the economy. By contrast, in a period
of improving economic conditions and under a
changed financial system with powerful en-
trepreneurial participants that can breed new fi-
nancial excesses, gradualism in moving toward a
less accommodative monetary policy — and even-
tually to a policy of restraint — carries the risk of
encouraging financial bubbles that will force eco-
nomic setbacks. What is needed is a more flexible
monetary policy that can be quickly adapted to
changed circumstances, even if that means revers-
ing course on a few occasions when false signals
intrude. Giving greater weight to conditions in
financial markets is a necessary ingredient of such
a flexible approach, since changes in asset prices
have a powerful effect on the net worth of the
private sector, influencing consumption and in-
vestment decisions, and borrowing intentions.
Sixth, before the end of this decade, the finan-
cial markets of many emerging countries, which
have flourished in recent years, will be hit with
substantial turbulence, far beyond the gyrations
that occurred in the last few months. This is be-
cause renewed economic growth in the industrial
world a few years from now will generate enlarged
credit demands and will reduce liquidity in the
industrial countries, limiting the availability of
funds for developing countries. Moreover, securi-
tized markets and the interwoven linkages of in-
ternational markets will expedite the flight of
capital whenever prospects appear to deteriorate.
Finally, I am more convinced than ever that
we will have a thoroughgoing overhaul of the
structure of official supervision of financial mar-
kets and institutions, both nationally and interna-
tionally. The question is “When?”  Will such a new
framework come about in an orderly manner, after
an intensive and relatively expeditious discussion
of alternatives? Or will it only come about after a
major financial crisis, in an attempt to repair the
damage? No one, least of all the American Ad-
ministration,  wants a new financial crisis, but
more importantly the American economy cannot
afford one. That is why I conclude that the answer
to the question “When?” is right now, when there
is still containable volatility in financial markets
— a condition that cannot be taken for granted a
few years hence, if nothing is done to improve the
structure and capabilities of our official supervi-
sory and regulatory institutions.
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